

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.24

19 April 1962

ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 15 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. PADILLA NERVO

(Mexico)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU

Mr. M. HAMID

Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K.K. RAO

Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. A. de ICAZA

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. R.I. SPIERS
Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the twenty-fourth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. SAHLOU (Ethiopia): May I first of all thank the Soviet representative for allowing me to speak before him? I understand he had already inscribed his name on today's list of speakers.

Speaking on behalf of the eight delegations which have presented the joint memorandum on a nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/28), I want to say that we have attentively studied the questions posed by Mr. Dean, the United States representative (ENDC/29), and Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, regarding this memorandum (ENDC/IV.22, page 20). I shall endeavour to set forth on behalf of the eight delegations the considerations of principle to which these interventions by the United Kingdom and United States representatives give rise.

It is our conviction that the joint memorandum must in most respects rest on its own merits, so to speak. It is not a blueprint for a treaty. It is rather our considered effort to break the deadlock in the three-Power talks. This implies that vast areas in the picture have to be filled in by detailed negotiations on the basis suggested in the joint memorandum. No delegation of the eight, I feel, can really give elaborate explanations which would be a substitute for the work that we believe can be undertaken only by the parties concerned. We are not in a position to offer a synopsis that will spare you the effort of new negotiations, new evaluations, new assessments and new compromises.

This does not imply that we have lightheartedly and haphazardly suggested ideas that are vague because we do not know our own mind. Each delegation has certainly given a great deal of thought to the technical and political issues involved. We have certainly tried to bear in mind the records of the discussions between the nuclear Powers, their various offers and proposals to each other, relevant scientific publications, and also the discussions which the three nuclear delegations have had with us and have permitted us to have with their scientists and technicians. We have tried to take into account the facts and considerations of which we have become aware through various channels, in addition of course to information from sources otherwise available to us.

(Mr. Sahlou, Ethiopia)

We feel that the memorandum puts before you the best results of our joint thinking. We would like to stress in this context that any emphasis we have given to existing scientific work and existing facilities is meant to be a sincere contribution because we feel it would be both unwise and unduly expensive to ignore what science has already achieved in the relevant spheres and the scientific apparatus which already exists. There is additional scope, according to our memorandum, for further developments by agreement. Our aim and purpose in presenting the memorandum was, as has been repeatedly indicated, to facilitate a new approach. It may be that it would now be the wish of the nuclear Powers to ask us to co-operate with them in some or all aspects of new negotiations. We shall willingly and gladly be of any service that we can in this regard. We should also be prepared to make scientific collaboration available to the best of our ability.

At this juncture, before we have any clear indication from the three countries concerned regarding their willingness to start anew on the basis of the joint memorandum, we believe that the memorandum has to be interpreted not by us but by you, the three nuclear Powers. This, we feel, is the most useful approach for all parties concerned. I will go one step further and say that, even if we were in a position to answer all your questions, we think this would prejudice the eventual solutions to such an extent or in such a way that agreement on these very solutions would become more difficult to attain. Further nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere by both sides are now imminent. Medical, genetic and related considerations make such testing by whoever is undertaking it contradictory to the aims and ambitions of the majority of mankind. Such tests are clearly in contradiction of the avowed aims of the nations participating in the Disarmament Conference.

We are, however, clearly and painfully aware that the spiralling of test series can be broken only if there is the political will to break it and if there is a common basis for negotiation. We do not doubt that this exists, and we hope that the joint memorandum, as it stands, with the difficulties it presents as regards substance, may nevertheless serve as such a basis. But it would be useless if it were not considered and accepted as a basis for negotiations within the shortest possible time. Thus we reiterate our hope that the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom will find it profitable and possible to enter into immediate, new and constructive negotiations using the

(Mr. Sahlou, Ethiopia)

joint memorandum as a starting point. This is our hope and this is what we, the eight delegations, feel is the pertinent question. We pray for a speedy and positive answer and action.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with close attention to the statement that has just been made by the representative of Ethiopia on behalf of the eight non-aligned States, and we note with deep satisfaction that the statement contained a fresh appeal to all nuclear Powers to enter into negotiations in order to establish a basis for the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests. The sponsors of the memorandum ask the nuclear Powers for a reply to their constructive proposals.

I am instructed by the Soviet Government to read out to the Committee a statement by the Soviet Government dated 19 April 1962 which is a reply to the memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned States.

"STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

"On 16 April 1962 eight neutralist States, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, submitted a Joint Memorandum on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests for consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. After making a careful study of this Memorandum, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to state the following.

"The Soviet Government has attached and continues to attach great importance to a solution of the question of discontinuing all nuclear weapon tests. The reaching of an agreement on this question would be a great contribution to the cause of maintaining and consolidating peace and would meet the most earnest hopes and aspirations of all peoples.

"With the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, a definite barrier would be placed in the path of the nuclear arms race, which is fraught with grave dangers for universal peace, a situation of greater confidence would be brought about in relations among States, and the solution of the main problem - the question of general and complete disarmament - would be substantially facilitated. With the discontinuance by all States of nuclear weapon tests, there would be an end to contamination of the atmosphere and the surface of the earth by radio-active substances which are harmful to the health of human beings.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"The Soviet Government and the Soviet people have these aims close at heart. Moved by the desire to bring about a speedy solution of the question of discontinuing nuclear tests, the Soviet Government has approached the Western Powers many times with concrete proposals to this effect. On 28 November 1961, at the negotiations on the discontinuance of tests, the Soviet Government submitted its draft agreement, on the basis of which it would be possible to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests for ever. For control over compliance by States with their obligations under an agreement, the Soviet Government proposed the use of national systems of detecting nuclear explosions, which States already have at their disposal.

"In the light of the latest achievements in science and technology, the adequacy of national systems of detection does not and cannot give rise to the slightest doubts on the part of those who are really concerned to ensure reliable control over the discontinuance of tests. In this case, practice and experience entirely corroborate theory. After all, it is a fact that all nuclear explosions conducted so far, whether by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom or France, have been recorded by national systems of detection in various countries-- no other systems have existed or exist up to now. Nor do underground nuclear explosions constitute an exception in this respect. Very convincing in this connexion was the detection of the underground nuclear explosion, recently conducted in the Soviet Union, by the United States Atomic Energy Commission - and not by means of any international control or the despatch of inspection teams into USSR territory, but exclusively by means of national systems. This means that the United States has at its disposal detection systems which are adequate for recording underground nuclear explosions, however far from the United States these explosions were carried out. The Soviet Union also has such detection systems at its disposal, as have many other States.

"The Soviet Government, true to its policy of peace and reducing international tension, has not relaxed for a single day its efforts in the struggle for a positive solution to the problem of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests, and during the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee the Soviet Government has more than once reaffirmed its readiness to sign, any day or any hour, an agreement which would put an end to nuclear explosions for ever and which, at the same time, would not jeopardize the national security interest of either side.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"However, the Soviet Government is compelled to note with deep regret that, despite its efforts, despite the efforts of many other peace-loving States, despite the fervent desire of millions and millions of people to put an end to nuclear weapon tests, this question remains unsettled.

"Why? Only because of the negative attitude of the Western Powers and, first and foremost, the United States. Now everyone realises that the policy of the United States and its allies in the NATO military bloc is directed not towards the discontinuance but towards the continuance of tests. The whole world is now living under the threat of a further large-scale series of United States atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in the area of the Pacific Ocean, which has already been announced for all to hear by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom which will inevitably intensify the nuclear arms race.

"Trying somehow to cover up their dangerous policy, to divert the attention of the peoples from the actions of those who intend to increase still further the tempo of nuclear competition, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom state that it is impossible to agree to the discontinuance of nuclear tests unless a wide-spread system of international control is established. But what purposes would be served by such a system, if one takes into account that it is absolutely unnecessary for verifying the fulfilment by States of their obligations under an agreement? An exhaustively clear answer to these questions was given by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, in his message of 12 April 1962 to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, in which he emphasized that it was a question of giving an opportunity to the organs of NATO to have their own agents in our territory under the pretext of international control, and in addition to military bases and troops stationed near the frontiers of the Soviet Union, to obtain our permission to carry on intelligence work in the territory of our own country. But the Soviet Union will never agree to this.

"These are the facts. If we are to call things by their proper names, then it must be quite definitely stated that the Western Powers have now led the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests into an impasse.

"The proposal of the eight neutralist States on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, submitted in the Eighteen Nation Committee on 16 April 1962, represents a serious attempt to lead the negotiations out of this

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

impasse. There can be no doubt that this desire arises from the sincere concern of the neutralist States in connexion with the situation which has arisen.

"Although not all the propositions in the Joint Memorandum of the eight States are equally clear, nevertheless it represents a constructive contribution, since it takes into account in a realistic manner the existing possibilities for a speedy solution of the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

"The Joint Memorandum suggests that control of the discontinuance of nuclear tests should be carried out by means of national networks of observation posts, that for the selection and processing of the data obtained at these posts it is sufficient to set up an International Commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, and that the question of inviting the Commission for the purpose of verifying in loco the circumstances of the occurrence of any particular suspicious events should be decided by the States themselves. All these propositions undoubtedly deserve attention and could be a useful basis for reaching agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests.

"The proposals of the eight neutralist States completely shatter the myth of the Western Powers that it is impossible to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests without establishing an extensive system of international control, under cover of which the military staffs of the NATO countries would like to plant a wide-spread network of espionage on the territories of the peace-loving States. Now nothing remains of this myth.

"The Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that the submission by the neutralist States of their proposals on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests gives rise to new hope for the solution of this question in the interest of all peoples.

"For its part, the Soviet Government expresses its willingness to study the proposals set out in the Memorandum of the neutralist States as a basis for further negotiations. Thus the Soviet Government gives a positive answer to the appeal of the Governments of the States sponsoring the Joint Memorandum and will continue its efforts to achieve as quickly as possible an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests for ever.

"It is obvious that fruitful negotiations on the discontinuance of tests cannot be conducted to the thunder of nuclear explosions. Therefore, the Soviet Government is of the opinion -- since this is the only way the spirit and sense of the proposals made by the neutralist States can be interpreted -- that now

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that these proposals hold out new prospects for the negotiations and for the attainment of agreement, it becomes even more important for the nuclear Powers to give a voluntary undertaking not to set off nuclear explosions while the negotiations are in progress. The Soviet Government confirms its readiness to give such an undertaking if the Western Powers will do likewise.

"The next few days must show the turn events are to take - whether towards an agreement to end nuclear weapon tests or towards further nuclear tests in the atmosphere. This depends entirely on the Governments of the United States and its allies. The Western Powers now have an opportunity to demonstrate in practice that they will not obstruct the settlement of the urgent problem of ending tests. The peoples of the world will never forgive them if this opportunity is missed.

"The Soviet Government appeals to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to listen to the voice of reason and to take the course of reaching agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests for all time.

The Soviet delegation requests that the statement by the Soviet Government should be circulated as an official document of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament^{1/}.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): We have listened this morning to two very important statements with regard to the joint memorandum submitted to us by the eight non-aligned countries. I shall deal first with the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia.

Speaking for myself, and I am sure for my United States colleague too, I would say that we have listened with great attention to what our Ethiopian colleague had to say to us. We quite understand his feeling that some of the questions we put were of an involved nature, and we quite understand his feeling that, as he put it, the joint memorandum must rest on its own merits.

We were seeking to find exactly what was intended in certain of the phrases which could have different meanings in different contexts. But we realize full well that the proposal was put forward as a genuine attempt to provide some new approach to this matter, which the three Powers have been examining for a very long time. As our Ethiopian colleague said to us, nothing could be a substitute

^{1/}Circulated as Document ENDC/32.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

for the work of the three Powers themselves. Of course, we did not expect that anything could be. But we did feel that it would be valuable to obtain reactions to some of these points. The very fact that we submitted these questions, indicated, I think, the care with which we had studied this document and the very considerable amount of thought that we had immediately addressed to it.

Our Ethiopian colleague stated that the joint memorandum placed before us the current thoughts of the eight non-aligned countries. It certainly did bring forward some fresh thoughts with respect to how we could solve this particular problem. We shall be very happy to give further thought to it in the light of what our Ethiopian colleague stated this morning.

I think it might be helpful if I were to try and draw together what seem to be the basic principles, as I understand it, underlying the joint memorandum. First, it seems to me that these new proposals do accept the principle of an international network of detection posts. But we thought that the degree to which such a system should be international or could be a mixture of national and international posts required certain clarification. That was the reason for some of the questions which we asked.

Secondly, it did seem to us that the memorandum accepted the principle of the establishment of an international body -- firstly, the international or national posts; secondly, an international body which would have as its prime function the reception and processing the data from the control posts, and thereafter the responsibility for taking some sort of action on the basis of the conclusions it might draw.

What we were not clear about was the composition suggested for this international commission, its method of operation and the authority which would be granted to it to take action when data had been processed and conclusions drawn. That was the reason for some of the other questions which my United States colleague and I asked on Tuesday.

Then, of course, there is the vital question of inspection. Here it seemed to us that the memorandum did accept the principle of international inspection, but the manner in which that inspection might be initiated and carried out -- I think my colleagues from the neutral countries will agree -- was not clarified. That was the reason for some of the questions directed to this particular sphere.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

There is also the question which perhaps underlies the whole concept of this new approach which the eight Powers have put to us. That is the question of the scientific capabilities of existing detection systems. On that, I was glad to see that our Ethiopian colleague indicated that our neutral colleagues would be glad to give us, in so far as they were able, any information or scientific help which they could provide.

All these are matters which I think it is our duty to study further most carefully.

This brings me to the intervention this morning of the representative of the Soviet Union. I listened with care to the very important points that he put forward. He of course gave us certain reminders of the position as seen by the Soviet Union during our discussions of recent months. I do not propose to dwell at length on the points he made again this morning in this regard, and which have been thrashed out ad nauseam in our discussions in the Sub-Committee of three and previously in the test ban talks themselves. I could not, of course, accept the Soviet interpretation of some of those discussions, nor could I accept the Soviet attitude that the Soviet Union has in fact constantly brought forward, as Mr. Zorin put it, proposals to the Western Powers to help solve the difficulties. The facts are on record. There is no need to go back on that. Moreover, it does not help us in solving our immediate difficulties.

The important thing is the reaction to any new proposals, and here I listened with great care to what Mr. Zorin had to say. As I understood it -- I shall certainly want to study in the record the precise wording because sometimes one is not able to get the exact nuances from an interpretation -- our Soviet colleague did express readiness to accept these proposals as a basis for further negotiation. If indeed he does so, I welcome that most warmly, because I myself am most anxious that we should continue our negotiations, and I am perfectly willing to continue those negotiations using as a basis these proposals which have been put forward -- assuming that the principles to which I have referred this morning are accepted. If the principle of an adequate international organization and the principle of on-site inspection are clearly accepted, that gives us an opportunity to go back to our discussions and to see what further progress we can make. We are willing, if our Soviet colleague really meant that he is ready to accept these proposals as I have interpreted them, as a basis for discussion -- if, in other words, he is accepting the

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principle of on-site inspection -- then I think this would mark a step forward and I would be only too glad, as I say, to continue discussions in the Sub-Committee of three.

I would also be very happy to take up the suggestion of our Ethiopian colleague that the neutrals -- some of them or as many as we wished -- should join us in those discussions. I have always been ready for this; I see no difficulty in having discussions with them or with others of our colleagues from East or West present. I require no isolation from our colleagues in order to continue these discussions; indeed I welcome the help of others. But if we can go forward to discussion, accepting as a basis these proposals of the neutral Powers, understanding that they do accept the principle of on-site inspection as well as the other principles to which I have referred, then I think that will give us an opportunity to make further progress.

We have been reminded of the urgency of any further steps. I am perfectly willing to meet again at once and to continue discussions. But bearing in mind what has happened in our previous discussions in the Sub-Committee -- and one has to be realistic about this -- I could not give any undertaking about what is likely to happen in regard to testing until we see very much further ahead as to the likelihood of reaching an agreement, and until we can have very definite assurances from our Soviet colleague that he is willing to accept the basic principles to which I have referred, and to interpret them and have them set down, clearly and unequivocally, in writing so that we may know that what the United Kingdom and I am sure also the United States regard as the essential basis of any agreement will be provided for and so that we know exactly that the essential element referred to by my leader, Lord Home, will be provided for -- namely, on adequate means of settling a dispute, if one occurs, as to whether a particular explosion is nuclear or natural. When Lord Home was here he reminded us several times that there must be an effective way of settling such a dispute about facts, because if there is not, then a treaty will be valueless. This is basic to our whole concept.

With these comments I would say: Let us by all means continue our discussions, let us see if we cannot find some way out of our difficulties. If our neutral colleagues have prompted some further reassessment by our Soviet colleagues to help us reach agreement on the basis about which I have been talking, then indeed they will have done us a great service. As I say, let us examine closely the statement

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which Mr. Zorin has made, and let us then proceed to further discussions either in the Sub-Committee of three, or with such additions as may be called for by the Sub-Committee, or in the Conference as a whole.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with the greatest interest to the remarks made this morning by the representative of Ethiopia. At the plenary meeting of 16 April I expressed the appreciation of my delegation for the spirit which had moved the eight new members of this Conference to put forward suggestions aimed at facilitating agreement among the nuclear Powers on a nuclear test ban treaty.

Today I must note my gratitude for the very careful consideration which has been given by the eight new members of this Conference to the questions formulated by the representative of the United Kingdom and myself and for the very considerate reply that we have heard today. Let me be very clear. My delegation is quite prepared and indeed willing to give the most serious consideration to the plan of the eight new members of this Conference in the framework proposed by its sponsors. We are quite prepared to have one or more, or all, of the eight new members participate in the work of the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee. In that respect, and indeed in all respects, I fully associate myself with the remarks which have been made this morning by the representative of the United Kingdom.

From listening to the representative of Ethiopia this morning, I understand that the eight new members of the Conference have conceived of their ideas not as a final blueprint but rather as an outline of a new approach which might, hopefully, eventually bridge the gap between the Soviet and the Western positions on a nuclear test ban. We in the United States delegation have been saying for some time that the crucial missing link in the nuclear test ban talks has been that there has been no common basis or platform for the Soviet-Western negotiations since the Soviet Union, on 28 November 1961, repudiated and abandoned its own scientists' unanimous recommendations in the experts' reports of 1958 and 1959, -- recommendations in which the Western scientists also concurred -- and completely abandoned all the scientific thinking on the question of how nuclear tests can be detected and identified. Therefore, we must clearly favour any suggestions which give hope of establishing this essential foundation. But if any such negotiations are to be fruitful, this essential foundation must be there. We are more than ready, as I have said, to explore such suggestions to the full in the test ban Sub-Committee established by our Conference.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I say that, after having carefully studied the eight-nation proposal, the position of the eight sponsors still seems to us somewhat obscure on the precise nature of the obligations that parties to the treaty are to undertake in regard to effective international control and objective, scientific on-site inspections. We fully recognize and appreciate that the plan envisages that some inspections will take place. But there still seems to us to be an element of voluntariness left to the country in which the unidentified event occurred and in which the inspection would take place, rather than an unquestioned right of inspection on the part of the international commission, if it decided that such an inspection was required. In our view, in any treaty that we may sign there cannot be any ambiguity about the commitment of each party to agree to this effective international control and to this objective, scientific on-site inspection taking place under certain specified conditions. If this is left obscure and there is no right of inspection, there really is no treaty or system at all, because the evidence can disappear during a long period of argument.

Of course, we have never doubted that in practice -- no matter what the text of the treaty might be -- no team of on-site inspectors could ever physically force its way on to the territory of a State where the unidentified event had occurred in order to conduct an inspection. Nevertheless, if a State kept such a team -- which had an international right to make such an inspection -- out of its territory in spite of a clear treaty obligation to admit it, there could not be any question in international law as to who had violated the terms of the treaty. But if there was ambiguity in the treaty on this point, or on the relationship between the international control commission and the several States parties to the treaty, and if the responsibility for preventing this on-site inspection could not be laid firmly on any party to the treaty, this would affect the decision of other parties to consider themselves free of their treaty obligations, and the world would not know precisely what had happened.

I could mention a number of other matters on which it seems to us, after some study, that the eight-nation plan would require considerable amplification. This applies, for example, to the whole general area of organizational arrangements for the control system, which would have to be considered not only in substance but in considerable detail if the eight-nation plan were to become a basis for negotiation.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

However, this is not the question which is most germane to our situation at the present time. I quite understand that the sponsors of the plan did not wish to become involved in such highly specialized problems. The fundamental and the most relevant consideration for my delegation -- and I say this with great respect to the eight new members of this Conference, for whose views and work we have the highest regard -- is that it is not with the eight new members of this Committee that the Western nuclear Powers are, after all, attempting to negotiate a nuclear test ban agreement. We very much hope that if we can work out an agreement with the Soviet Union all the eight countries, and indeed many others, will sign the future nuclear test ban treaty. Nevertheless, I think we must face the fundamental fact that the basic agreement must be reached first among the three nuclear Powers. The eight nations have been most helpful and most constructive and have offered us some very useful guidelines, but, as in the past, the real key to the resolution of our difficulties lies with the Soviet Union; it cannot be found in the suggestions of the eight nations -- although they are most helpful indeed.

I listened with great sadness to the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union. For some three years we have been trying to work out a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. As my United Kingdom colleague has said, all the creative, imaginative and progressive proposals in every respect have been made by the Western Powers. I am sorry to say that there has been only retrogression by the Soviet Union from the effective system which their own scientists recommended.

I hope that my first impression of the Soviet representative's comments and the Soviet Government statement which he read into the record on the suggestions made by the eight new members of this Conference regarding a nuclear test ban treaty is not an accurate one. But, as I understood it, they seemed to give very little reason for hope. I shall of course carefully study his remarks and the Soviet statement. I must say in all frankness, however, that it sounded to me very much as though our Soviet colleague had not grasped at all the true essence of the plan outlined by the eight nations. Unfortunately the Soviet statement of the Soviet position is most unclear. As is regrettably sometimes the case with Soviet statements, the Soviet Union would appear to approve only those parts of the eight-nation plan which seem to coincide with the Soviet position on test ban controls -- that is, the parts of the plan which mention national detection systems

(Mr. Dean, United States)

as set forth in what is, to us at least, the wholly unacceptable Soviet proposal of 28 November. On the rest of the eight-nation plan, on what seems to us to be the essence of the plan, on its most essential features, concerning international control and adequate scientific on-site inspection, the Soviet delegation is completely silent.

In other words, it is the same old story. The Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate on the basis of those aspects of the eight-nation plan which it finds completely satisfactory, and it chooses to ignore all the remaining aspects of that plan, which involve measures of adequate and effective international control, with adequate and objective on-site inspection. This is like saying: I accept everything that is in my favour; I completely reject as a basis of negotiation anything that I do not like.

Unfortunately, that has been the attitude of the Soviet Union for over a year now, during which it has flatly refused to consider over twenty major concessions and plans put forward by the United Kingdom and the United States. I am very sorry to say that, but I am afraid we have to face the facts, because they are facts and they cannot be controverted; they are in the record and, with all his skill, Mr. Zorin cannot controvert them. He cannot find in the record a single proposal -- not one -- by the Soviet Union that would advance a nuclear test ban treaty. I challenge him to do so.

The essence of any attempt to accommodate opposing views, an attempt which the eight delegations have most sincerely and conscientiously made, is that neither side can hope or expect to have its own views adopted 100 per cent; that is also the essence of negotiation. My delegation has made it clear that the questions it has already put and some of the other questions it has on various elements of the eight-nation plan have been put merely to obtain information for our own study and for clarification. But on the basis I have outlined -- that is, that the Soviet Union does not reject this theory of international controls and adequate and objective on-site inspection, which is in the eight-nation plan as I read it -- we are quite willing to go forward, using this plan as a basis for further exploration, either in the plenary Conference or in the test ban Sub-Committee with all the eight nations represented, or with one or more of them represented, or with anyone else present that the Conference may choose.

But let me be clear about this: unless the Soviet Union is willing to indicate clearly, unequivocally and without reservation, in writing -- I repeat, in writing -- that the Soviet Union is willing to accept the principle of sound international

(Mr. Dean, United States)

control including objective, scientific on-site inspection, with all the safeguards against espionage that seem reasonable and that they want to put in; and that the Soviet Union is willing to undertake negotiations with an open mind and with readiness to alter their completely rigid past positions, including their totally unacceptable proposals of 28 November 1961, we just cannot anticipate any significant progress. I will not go into detail, but the statement which the Soviet representative made about the ability to detect and identify nuclear tests was just not in accordance with the scientific facts which his own scientists have accepted.

Another unfortunate aspect of the Soviet statement was the rather bald effort to link further discussions and negotiations here on the eight-nation plan with a commitment by the nuclear Powers not to conduct any further nuclear tests during the negotiations. In the patient efforts by the President and Government of the United States to reach a nuclear test ban agreement with the Soviet Union, in the many painstaking and patient attempts by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and in all the trouble they have gone to in an effort to persuade Premier Khrushchev to sign a nuclear test ban treaty which would stop all nuclear tests, I think we have made our position abundantly clear on this question and that there can be no mistake about it.

Let me be very clear. The United States will not expose itself again -- as it exposed itself last September when it was negotiating in good faith with the Soviet Union in another room of this Palais -- to being caught by a Soviet abandonment, on a completely unilateral basis, of a test ban moratorium on some patently-invented and hastily-concocted pretext of changed world conditions. We have offered to sign a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union; the draft of that treaty has been circulated to the representatives here. We are prepared to negotiate on the fundamental principles set forth in that treaty and upon the fundamental principles of the Geneva experts reports of 1958 and 1959 which the Soviet Union had previously accepted. The United States will renounce the testing of nuclear weapons only when a sound and reasonable test ban treaty providing for measures of effective international control and adequate and objective scientific on-site inspection, has been signed.

Moreover, we not only question but we deny the right of the Soviet delegation even to pose this question to us. After all, it represents the nation which

(Mr. Dean, United States)

unilaterally broke the last unofficial moratorium on testing after a no-testing period of three years, and it then went on to conduct, almost every day, a massive series of over forty tests in the atmosphere during 1961 until it finally exploded its fifty-eight or sixty megaton, or perhaps even larger, bomb.

The United States has never made negotiations on disarmament measures contingent on prior agreements to arrange a military standstill while the talks went on. We are now discussing disarmament measures affecting delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction; but while we do so the testing and the production of aircraft and missiles are carried on apace by all major Powers. Indeed, on 16 March Chairman Khrushchev said he could destroy the United States from any direction -- a statement which, I am sure, greatly contributed to the peace of the world. I am sure it made everybody feel very happy that missiles of great destructive power could rain upon the United States from any direction -- over the North Pole, or the South Pole, from East or West -- and that they could annihilate the entire United States population. I am sure that that was not war propaganda; I am sure it contributed to world peace; and I am sure it was deemed to add to the tranquillity of all the little school-children in the United States.

Now let me make this very clear. Despite its shock and surprise at the unilateral Soviet test resumption last year, what did the United States do? As Mr. Zorin well knows, Mr. McCloy and I continued to negotiate with him on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. We went forward, with President Kennedy's approval. That Statement was signed on 20 September. Even while the atmosphere was ringing with the Soviet tests, President Kennedy put our plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world before the United Nations. We continued to press for the principles in our nuclear test ban treaty at the General Assembly; and the principles in that treaty were approved, with the Soviet Union voting against them. We supported the request to the Soviet Union not to test the fifty-eight megaton bomb. And what was its response? The world knows what its response was.

After that debate the United States again took the initiative of inviting the Soviet Union to return to the table of the nuclear test ban Conference here in Geneva, and this led to the resumption of talks on 28 November. We have been continually willing to negotiate and we are now willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union. So I submit, in all candour, that we can find absolutely no

(Mr. Dean, United States)

grounds for Soviet challenges to the West in this matter. I urge our Soviet colleagues not to complicate the already difficult question of carrying on nuclear test ban negotiations by raising this additional issue of an uncontrolled, uninspected, unpoliced and unsigned moratorium.

Having said this, I would conclude by restating my belief that our urgent need is to have the Soviet Union abandon its completely intransigent position as expressed on 28 November 1961, in which it repudiated everything to which it had previously agreed, and to have it clarify the position it adopts towards negotiations in the framework of the eight-nation plan, the fundamental part of which, as I have said, envisages an application of the principles of international controls and on-site inspection. There should be no doubts on this matter when we again undertake serious efforts with the eight nations to make progress in this important field.

The United States is more than willing to carry on these negotiations with the Soviet Union for a nuclear test ban treaty. We sincerely thank the eight new members of this Conference for their hard work, their conscientiousness and the impetus that their initiative has given to these negotiations. I hope the eight new nations will not misunderstand me when I say -- and I am very sorry to say this -- that the United States can no longer rely on an uninspected, unpoliced moratorium.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): This is the first time I have spoken during this debate on the problem of a nuclear test suspension agreement since the joint memorandum of the eight nations was submitted to the plenary meeting on 16 April (ENDC/PV.21, page 20). First of all I want to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Canadian delegation, to commend the eight delegations, authors of this memorandum, for their imaginative and constructive effort to find a compromise acceptable to both sides.

We have listened with very great care to what has been said by the representatives of the nuclear Powers who have been negotiating for a test suspension treaty for so long. My comments on what has been said this morning will be subject to my having correctly understood, on the one hand, Mr. Zorin's remarks from the simultaneous interpretation and, on the other hand, what was said by the United Kingdom and the United States representatives. However, I gather from the statement of the Soviet Government which was read into the record

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

by the Soviet representative that the Soviet Union thinks that this memorandum of the eight neutral States generates new hope that a solution can be reached, that the Soviet Government is ready to consider proposals as a basis for further negotiations, and that it will exert its efforts to achieve agreement.

I noted that Mr. Godber welcomed Soviet acceptance of this memorandum as a basis for negotiations and stated that the United Kingdom, for its part, was ready to continue. He had certain questions and doubts and raised the point as to whether, in fact, the Soviet Union was prepared to accept certain of the fundamental principles of the memorandum, as he understood them. He was ready, as I understand it, to explore the possibilities of reaching a compromise on the basis put forward. We have also heard from the United States representative that, subject to the clearly expressed acceptance of certain basic principles of the memorandum, the United States is prepared to go forward with negotiations on this new basis.

The Canadian delegation hopes that it has correctly interpreted the statements which have been made here. In any case we hope that the nuclear Powers will re-examine their positions on the basis of very careful consideration of this proposal and enter into further negotiations which might make a test ban agreement possible.

As the Prime Minister of Canada reaffirmed on 17 April in the House of Commons, the Canadian Government is opposed to nuclear testing, and it is for this reason that the Canadian Government believes that an agreement must be reached which will make possible a final end to all nuclear testing everywhere and at any time. It further believes that this could only be effective, and that there could only be assurance that it would be carried out and be permanent if there were reasonable means of verification. We realize that the adjustments required to achieve a test ban agreement will not be easy to make. I need not tell any of you here how serious the problem is.

The Canadian Prime Minister indicated last Monday that the probability of a new round of nuclear weapon tests by both sides is hanging over our negotiations. He pointed out that the main issue in the debate relates to the arrangements required for effective verification of the test ban. This is what he told the Canadian people in his speech. In commenting on the problem of verification he said that effective verification arrangements "should not involve intrusion in the domestic affairs, or a threat to the security of any nation. The West is not asking for 100 per cent certainty. What we seek is the degree of verification needed to ensure that a test ban will be faithfully observed.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

It is of prime importance that international efforts to reach agreement on a test ban should not be abandoned. In fact, the urgency of achieving a safeguarded treaty is even greater since a spiralling series of tests could create a negative atmosphere at the disarmament negotiations, and by raising tensions prejudice progress towards the solution of other international problems."

We were interested in the reply of the representative of Ethiopia to questions put to the eight sponsoring nations at an earlier meeting, and his suggestion, which was accepted, as I understand it, by all three nuclear Powers that some or all of the eight nations could be prepared to participate in further negotiations as well as to bring in their scientific advisers in an endeavour to clarify what they had in mind and what they thought would be possible and sufficient in regard to international verification and the other problems which are involved and which must be solved if there is to be a nuclear test ban agreement. We should very much welcome such an arrangement, and we hope in any case that the nuclear Powers, knowing the great responsibility that rests on them on the eyes of the world to reach agreement, will resume negotiations on the basis of the compromise suggested in the memorandum put forward by the eight nations here. In conclusion, I wish again to express the appreciation of the Canadian delegation for the work they have done and for their sincerity, care and devotion in doing it.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I too should like to thank the representative of Ethiopia for the explanations he has given us this morning concerning the memorandum submitted by the eight delegations. Our attitude towards this memorandum is well known; we are in favour of any fresh attempt to resolve the difficulties confronting us. Everytime we have spoken we have stressed the point that we must continue our efforts until agreement is reached. So we immediately welcomed with the greatest satisfaction the action taken by the eight delegations, in which we see an unquestionable spirit of constructive collaboration and a valuable display of good-will.

In view of the delicate nature of the subject, we quite understand the position which the representative of Ethiopia explained to us this morning on behalf of the eight delegations. The Italian delegation considers that the memorandum should be referred to the Sub-Committee of the three nuclear Powers, which should study it thoroughly.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The text proposed to us by the eight delegations will have to be interpreted and amplified, and I think that for this purpose the individual statements made by the eight delegations during the previous discussions will be particularly useful. I listened to them with close attention at the time, and I had the impression that most of those delegations accepted the principle and the necessity of international control. I am therefore convinced that the eight nation memorandum embodies the substance of that principle. It is clear that we ourselves cannot abandon the application of international control even though it be very limited.

I hope that thorough study and amplification of the eight nation memorandum may be of great help in our efforts to solve the basic problems to which I have several times drawn the attention of the Conference. How can international control be organized without any possibility of espionage? On this question I think that the eight nation memorandum may be most useful, and it is in this belief that I propose that the document be referred to the Sub-Committee of the nuclear Powers for thorough study.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): The Polish delegation considers that the statement made by the Soviet representative today is a constructive and important contribution to our work, which will make it easier to reach an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Thus new prospects of rapid and fruitful negotiations on this extremely important question are opening up.

We think that the proposal of the eight non-aligned States, which bears the stamp of goodwill and objectivity, provides a good basis for these negotiations, and we venture to hope that the Western Powers also will accept it. For the moment, I must say that the position is not clear. From what I have heard the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom say here, it seems that they are prepared to accept the proposal as a basis for negotiation; but at the same time they appear to qualify their agreement by a number of reservations. Our Committee has the right to expect a clear and definite reply from the United States and the United Kingdom. We have not had such a reply today. What is more, the United States representative is asking the Soviet Union to commit itself in advance to interpreting the eight nation proposal as the United States requires.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

All that is not encouraging. At the same time, it is obvious that the basic condition for success is to avoid any act which would worsen the atmosphere of the negotiations, and it is clear that the resumption of nuclear tests by one of the nuclear powers would be such an act. The Soviet representative said just now that his Government was willing to refrain from carrying out any nuclear tests during the negotiations. We hope that the United States, which is preparing to carry out such tests in a few days time, will consider with a full sense of responsibility the new situation which opens the way for fruitful negotiations, and will ensure a favourable atmosphere for these negotiations. We should like the United States to give us an assurance on that point and to adopt a clear and positive attitude towards the proposal of the non-aligned States. Mr. Dean's statement shows that the United States is not willing to undertake to refrain from resuming tests, even for the duration of negotiations on the eight nation proposal. Will the United States really assume such a moral responsibility towards the peoples of the world -- the responsibility for destroying one more chance of reaching agreement? We can only hope that it will not.

Mr. LALL (India): The delegation of India takes the floor today with a special sense of responsibility. We are dealing with a most delicate and difficult matter, a matter of concern not only to all the countries sitting around this table but to all the countries which are absent from this table. All of us heard the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia, speaking on behalf of the eight delegations -- including the delegation of India -- which sponsored the joint memorandum on the question of nuclear tests. We then heard statements from the representatives of the three nuclear Powers, and three other statements.

May I first say that we greatly welcome the statement made by our colleague from Canada? We thought this statement was in the spirit of the effort which must now be made by the nuclear Powers, and by all of us, if some solution is to be found to this problem. The joint memorandum of the eight countries is there as a basis of negotiation. It would be a pity -- indeed a tragedy -- if that memorandum became the basis for pulling the nuclear Powers farther apart from each other. With great respect to the three nuclear Powers, I must say that both sides -- that is to say, all three of those Powers; they fall into two broad categories -- have made interpretations of the joint memorandum. Now the

(Mr. Lall, India)

nuclear Powers are entitled, of course, to their own interpretations of our memorandum, but what we are asking them is simply this: "Please negotiate on the basis of our memorandum. You have your interpretations. Go together to a negotiating table. If you wish, ask any or all of us to join you if you think we could help. But please negotiate."

This is a grave matter. It is a matter with which, of course, the nuclear Powers are primarily concerned. Of course we agree with Mr. Dean when he says that an agreement must be reached not with us, the non-nuclear Powers, but by the three nuclear Powers. We are very conscious of that fact. However, at the same time it is only correct that we should remind the three nuclear Powers that the question on which they are going to negotiate, and we believe reach agreement on, is not of concern to them alone: it is of concern to us also. In that sense the three nuclear Powers are not only negotiating for themselves -- they are negotiating for the world in this matter and not only for themselves.

Moreover, science and technology are not the monopoly of any country. If three or four Powers today are exploding nuclear weapons, ten, twelve, fifteen or twenty Powers may be exploding nuclear weapons in the next few years, and that is also something which we want to avoid.

Therefore, with great respect to the nuclear Powers, while we fully admit that it is they who must reach agreement, we are deeply concerned in this matter. We believe it to be our duty to request them to negotiate and to reach agreement.

We respect the fact that they have their own interpretations of our joint memorandum. But we note with satisfaction that none of them has in any sense rejected the memorandum as a basis for negotiation. That is what is important. If they have their different interpretations, that is just what they should take to the negotiating table, that is just what they should talk to each other about. If we can be of assistance, we would be very happy to do so.

It is relevant to this point that the representative of Canada said that Canada hoped that in any case the nuclear Powers would re-examine their positions in new negotiations. Some re-examination is essential if there is to be an agreement. We trust that this wise anticipation by the representative of Canada will prove to be correct.

I believe that the representative of Italy made a most constructive and statesmanlike proposal. He suggested that the joint memorandum of the eight countries should now be sent to the three nuclear Powers for further and deeper

(Mr. Lall, India)

examination -- that is to say, it should become the basis of negotiation. If that is what Mr. Cavalletti meant, we fully agree with this statement. We trust that the three nuclear Powers will now take this joint memorandum as the basis of negotiations and will enter into the spirit of negotiation that is essential for the solution of this problem, which does not concern them alone: it concerns many more people than they have among their populations; many times the number of Americans, Russians and British in the world are involved in this issue, and we expect the nuclear Powers to take this into account.

Peace is not a monopoly of the nuclear Powers. Peace is a necessity for the peoples of the world, and we who come from countries for which peace is a dire necessity, countries like my own and those of many delegations round this table, implore and beg the representatives of the nuclear Powers to negotiate again constructively and helpfully, and to reach agreement, an agreement which will not only stop nuclear tests but which will give us the basis for constructive work in this Conference.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): The Romanian delegation has followed with great interest the debates which have taken place in our Conference on the conclusion of a test ban treaty. Our interest arises from the fact that our people, as well as all peoples of the world, demand the conclusion of a treaty that will stop all nuclear weapon tests for all time. All the peoples expect that our proceedings on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests will lead to real progress, which will result in agreement on a treaty incorporating that progress.

It is clear to all of us that an agreement which would prevent a new spurt and spiral in the armaments race, with all the serious aggravation of international tension that this implies, could easily be reached if the United States and the United Kingdom were to give up their plan for carrying out a new series of atmospheric tests.

The Indian Government has proposed that the nuclear Powers should refrain from renewing nuclear weapon tests at least during our proceedings. The non-aligned countries in the Conference have endorsed this proposal. The socialist delegations have agreed to it. The socialist nuclear Power, the Soviet Union, has stated its willingness to refrain from conducting new nuclear weapon tests if the Western Powers would undertake a similar agreement. The Western nuclear

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Powers have been the only ones not to respond favourably to the Indian initiative.

The Romanian delegation wishes to put on record its conviction that the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the Western Powers can only have a very negative influence on international relations in general and on the future of our work in particular. I want to express the desire that the earnest appeal to stop all nuclear weapon tests, a desire which is that not only of the non-aligned countries but of all peoples of the world, should be given proper consideration by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. It is our considered opinion that nuclear weapon tests should not be renewed either in the atmosphere or anywhere else, and that a test ban treaty should be concluded.

The Romanian delegation favours all constructive proposals, and we want to express at this time our full support of the initiative taken by the eight non-aligned countries. We wish to pay sincere tribute to them for their valuable contribution towards achieving our goal of concluding a nuclear test ban treaty.

I want to underline the constructive approach that has been manifested by the Soviet Government, which once again has demonstrated its ardent wish to assist in creating conditions necessary to achieve a world without weapons, general and complete disarmament. By accepting the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers as a basis for discussion here, the Soviet delegation has given a convincing example of its decision to use every possible and reasonable means in order to arrive at a solution of the serious problems confronting us, problems which are those not only of the peoples and governments which we represent here, but of humanity as a whole.

The acceptance by the Soviet Union of the eight-Power joint memorandum as a basis for further consideration and negotiations solves half the problem. It is now for the Western nuclear Powers to show that they are ready to go halfway in order to fulfil the hopes so impressively expressed by the joint memorandum and again today by the representative of Ethiopia.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, said this morning that the whole matter should be studied further with care. In the present situation further study, which is undoubtedly most desirable, can best be achieved by beginning negotiations on the basis of the ideas of the joint memorandum. Those ideas, as is true of any basis and framework of negotiations, cannot but be general and contain gaps which have to be filled by subsequent discussions.

(Mr. Macovoscu, Romania)

I must confess that I was utterly surprised when the representative of the United States called the Soviet Union's acceptance of the neutrals' proposal a flat rejection of the ideas which it does not like, and so forth and so on. We did not hear such a statement today from the Soviet Union. On the contrary we understood the Soviet Union to express readiness for discussion on the basis proposed, despite the fact that not all of the points seemed to be equally complete and clear. Notwithstanding the obvious efforts of the representative of the United States to place on the shoulders of the Soviet Union the blame for the tests which the United States itself is about to begin, I think the record of this meeting will be very significant in showing who said "Yes" and who was not ready to say "Yes" to a new, creative and sincere initiative aimed at solving an issue of universal importance.

The question we face at this very moment, the problem with which we are confronted at this moment, is the following. Are the other nuclear Powers ready to accept the suggestions and ideas of the joint memorandum as a basis for immediate negotiations, as the Soviet Union has done? Are the Western nuclear Powers ready to assume the obligation not to begin fresh nuclear weapon testing while our discussions continue on this new basis? It is to be hoped that the United States and United Kingdom will approach the problem of banning nuclear weapon tests in a constructive and realistic spirit. This will enable us to achieve the progress so eagerly sought by all peoples of the world. It is with this hope in mind that I conclude my remarks.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We have reached a very important stage in our discussions in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. We have today begun to discuss the proposal on the question of nuclear tests submitted on 16 April by the eight non-aligned nations. As several previous speakers have observed, and as was pointed out at the time when it was submitted, this memorandum was introduced as a constructive effort to help us solve the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, for which active preparations are being made and which are taking place underground almost every day in the United States.

The eight nations have endeavoured to find a basis on which negotiations could be renewed, not, as hitherto, in an atmosphere of discord and adhering to diametrically-opposed positions, but in a more constructive manner -- a basis

(Mr. Tarabansv, Bulgaria)

on which it would be possible to establish an organization and to conclude an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

It will be remembered that, immediately after this document was submitted to our Committee, a volley of questions was put by some delegations. It was certainly difficult for the non-aligned States to reply to all these questions, for to do so would have meant taking a position on problems which require study and which are so difficult to solve that the nuclear Powers had not been able to solve them during years and years of discussion. And as I understand it, that was the reply given today by the representative of Ethiopia on behalf of the eight non-aligned nations. I note that his reply was much appreciated by all the delegations which have spoken up to now. Indeed, they thought it was really very difficult to answer these questions, since to do so would have meant trying to solve the problem for the nuclear Powers, rather than providing a basis for negotiation.

My delegation and my country much appreciate the efforts made by the eight non-aligned nations with a view to resumption of the discussion and the negotiations on a different basis from that on which they have so far been conducted.

This morning we had a clear, definite and positive reply from the Soviet Union to the question raised by the eight-nation memorandum. In spite of certain difficulties with the interpretation of some of the views presented in the eight-nation memorandum, the Soviet Union said: We are prepared to take this memorandum as a basis for discussion and to continue negotiations on the understanding that meanwhile there must be no nuclear tests, which would darken the international atmosphere and create obstacles to an easy solution of the problem. The Soviet reply is thus an acceptance of the whole of the eight-nation proposal as a clear and definite basis for discussion.

Immediately after the Soviet Union had taken this positive attitude towards the eight-nation memorandum, we heard the statements of Mr. Godber, the representative of the United Kingdom and Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States. We have tried to put a positive interpretation on those statements, but what can one say about them? I must frankly confess that they came like a cold shower - like an icy shower - after the request of the eight nations that we should take the memorandum as a basis for discussion and continue negotiations.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

What surprises me most about these replies and these statements is that they were already prepared and that the speakers were only waiting for the Soviet reply to be able to say immediately that the Western Powers did not agree to negotiate on the basis proposed.

This position, this factual situation, should certainly not come as a surprise if we consider the whole sequence of positions taken up by the Western countries in the negotiations on nuclear tests. You can well remember the position they have taken in the past. This morning Mr. Dean reiterated it; he has already learnt the phrase by heart: (continued in English) We want nothing to do with an uninspected, unpoliced, uncontrolled moratorium.

(Continued in French) It is always the same story; we have often heard the Western Powers say that their attitude was flexible, that they were ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union, that they were ready to make concessions if a common basis could be found.

I could quote here many statements by the representative of the United States or the representative of the United Kingdom. At our meeting on 4 April the United States representative said:

"As one of the nuclear Powers, the United States Government and the people of the United States are deeply concerned about the most effective way to obtain a test ban ..." (ENDC/PV.15, page 5)

And further on:

"... No nation could be more anxious than we to conclude a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments with the necessary safeguards. We keenly feel a special responsibility to the rest of mankind, with whom our fate is inseparably linked, to do our utmost to devise a solution for our difficulties.

"Our need is for all the constructive assistance we can find, and it is in this light that we have been particularly grateful for the statements made here by the representatives of so many countries, statements to which we shall give our closest and most earnest attention."

Nethertheless, after studying all the statements made, on which there has been so much discussion, and especially those of the non-aligned nations, this morning we have just heard a categorical refusal by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom to take the memorandum as a basis for discussion, except under certain conditions. And what are those conditions? There must be

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

inspection, there must be international control and there must be compulsory on-site inspection. What does that mean? Does it not mean that when you make conditions for accepting such a basis of discussion you are accepting your own conditions and your own positions? What other proposals have you accepted in that sense? That was the perfectly clear reply of both representatives, not of the United States representative only.

That being so, all the efforts made by the Western countries represented here, or by the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of the United States, to submerge the question under a flood of discussion and tell us all their objections to certain formulas in the memorandum or certain phrases in the extremely positive reply of the Soviet Union, are intended only to distract attention from the negative reply they give to the questions raised by the memorandum.

Nevertheless, all the non-aligned countries and all the countries represented here, the representatives of all countries and the peoples of the whole world, as the Indian representative reminded us this morning, expect our Conference and the nuclear Powers to reach agreement, because it is not merely the populations and the peoples of the nuclear countries that are concerned, but the population of the whole world; and we are faced with a continuation of the arms race which, if nuclear tests are resumed, will surely lead to a war resulting in mass destruction of human life.

In these circumstances many representatives have stressed, both in the past and now, the urgency of finding a solution of the problem of discontinuing nuclear tests. Does it show an understanding of this urgency to ask, as certain representatives have done today: What is to be done about our nuclear tests in the light of our present discussions, for we have not yet sufficiently studied all the questions that have been raised here? The reply is clear and definite: we intend to continue our nuclear tests whether you discuss or not, whether or not you submit memoranda on the basis of which you wish us to reach agreement.

That is nothing less than the certainty that the Western countries intend to continue their nuclear tests. However, we do not think we can reach agreement to the sound of the nuclear test explosions which the United States and the United Kingdom are preparing to carry out in the Pacific as soon as possible.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

We have been told, especially in the statements by the United States, that they and the United Kingdom would of course be willing to take the memorandum as a basis for discussion, but that they could not undertake to do so unless the Soviet Union accepted their conditions for reaching agreement. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations should be taken as a basis for discussion and for solution of the problem of nuclear tests by negotiation. This is a most serious and positive endeavour by these eight nations, and we should do everything we can, both in the Committee and in the Sub-Committee, and particularly in discussions between the nuclear Powers, to reach an agreement which is not negotiated under a shower of radioactive fall-out from the nuclear tests being prepared for by the United States and the United Kingdom -- an agreement which will, in fact, put an end to these tests and enable us to live in a more peaceful world.

The United States and the United Kingdom have today attempted to sidetrack the discussion by claiming that they were not clear about all these questions. We think that this attitude should not be used as a pretext - that we should not allow them to use it as a pretext - for continuing their nuclear tests and making us hold our future meetings to the sound of their test explosions.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I have listened with great care to the speeches of a number of representatives since I spoke earlier this morning. I do not want to take up many of the points made by some of the representatives of the Eastern bloc of countries; I do not think there is much point in going over the past. I would only say to them that I was present at the United Nations meetings in New York in September and October last year and I recall the attitudes of their governments to the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union then. If they are going to be strictly logical and follow the same course, I suggest they should think over what they said and did then and realize that one cannot consider the present position in isolation. But I am concerned more with the proposals we have before us than with making debating points about the past.

As I said earlier this morning, I listened with great care to what the representative of the Soviet Union said; I want to study this in the record and to get elucidation of it. But he must not be surprised if we in the West are somewhat sceptical about the implications of what he said this morning, because

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

we cannot forget the statement from Chairman Khrushchev in reply to my own Prime Minister which he read into the record on Monday of this week (ENDC/27), a statement in which, as I understood it, Chairman Khrushchev categorically denied the very basis of negotiations which the West has always said it must have and which the Soviet Union itself, until last November, said was necessary. So if in fact he categorically denied that basis for discussion on Monday, it is not really surprising that we are wondering just what are the implications of the statement made by Mr. Zorin this morning. If in fact it does mark a complete move away from that very hard position, then no one will welcome it more warmly than I.

I have been wondering what is the best way to proceed in order to avoid prolonging the discussion this morning, and I think -- I put this forward as my own thought -- it might be helpful if the Sub-Committee were to reconvene this afternoon, if that suited my colleagues, the co-Chairmen, and possibly our Soviet colleague could explain to us more precisely what is the implication behind the statement made by Mr. Zorin this morning. Because if he can give us very firm assurances on those fundamental points -- and, make no mistake about it, they are fundamental to our attitude -- this will help us move forward in our negotiations. We hope to continue negotiations, we want to arrive at a satisfactory treaty, but it must be one with adequate safeguards. If he can give us those assurances I think we can make progress, using the proposals put forward by the eight neutral Powers as a basis for our discussions. I think that would probably be the most helpful way to proceed. It seems to me we must find out exactly what is in each other's mind, and if our Soviet colleague can help us in this way we may be able to make progress; I hope we can.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from French): I should like to explain the position of the Czechoslovak delegation on all that has been said during the discussion.

All the previous speakers, even the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers, have been at one in expressing appreciation of the constructive and positive efforts made by the eight non-aligned countries to break the deadlock on the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests. Like all other delegations, we have made a very careful study of the joint memorandum submitted on 16 April, which embodies those efforts. We believe that it provides a solid basis for

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

extricating ourselves from the impasse caused by the position taken up by the Western nuclear Powers, a position which is tantamount to an ultimatum.

When we heard the statements by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on 16 April in which they promised to study this proposal by the non-aligned countries, we thought their attitude seemed promising. But, the questions they put on the following day and those they have put this morning have raised doubt whether this is not a further attempt to steer the discussion of a clear-cut issue, the consideration of a constructive proposal into the sphere of technicalities and points of detail with a view to obscuring the whole problem and the real purpose of this constructive proposal.

We therefore welcome the fact that the sponsors of the memorandum have not allowed themselves to be diverted into this area of uncertainty, as shown by the reply given this morning in the statement of the representative of Ethiopia.

The statement submitted by the Soviet Government to our Committee this morning provides further proof of the Soviet Union's unceasing and constructive efforts to reach a peaceful solution of all problems and free the world from the threat of a nuclear war. As we could all see for ourselves, it was a clear and precise reply to the eight-nation appeal. After that reply we awaited, and despite the statements just made by the representatives of the Western Powers we are still awaiting, a positive response from the United States and the United Kingdom.

The questions put by the United Kingdom representative in his first statement and in the one he has just made are not indicative of an unqualified willingness to accept the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for discussion. What we see in the United Kingdom representative's statement and, in an even more clear-cut and pronounced form, in that of the United States representative is an attempt to lay down conditions not only for the Soviet Union, but also for the sponsors of the memorandum and this Committee.

We are witnessing an attempt to introduce into the constructive proposals made by the eight Powers factors which, in the past, have proved to militate against the attainment of agreement. Why put to the Soviet Union questions that are tantamount to ultimatums, when it has indicated its readiness to negotiate on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum?

In his last statement the United Kingdom representative made renewed attempts to put questions of this type. We are ready to negotiate, he said, but only

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provided the Soviet Union accepts our conditions. This is not, in our opinion, a constructive attitude that can help the Committee to find a way out of the impasse in which it has already found itself for some time. And yet when this memorandum was submitted and when it was accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis for discussion, we thought that a way out of this impasse had been found.

Instead of putting questions such as those the United Kingdom representative has put to the Soviet Union, we should -- and this is particularly true of the representatives of the Western Powers -- bear in mind the questions that the world is asking us and which, as the representative of India reminded us this morning, are being asked by mankind as a whole. Are the Western nuclear Powers really ready to negotiate on the basis of the eight-nation proposal, but in an atmosphere free from the threat of an impending resumption of nuclear tests? To ask whether such negotiations can be conducted in the shadow of imminent tests is not to complicate the issue, as the United States representative put it. The issue is being complicated by those who are responsible for this threat, those who insist on carrying out these tests. This is not an academic or a theoretical complication; it is unfortunately of practical significance to the whole human race, which is faced with this threat.

We would therefore urge the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers, instead of engaging in the recriminations and charges of which Mr. Dean's statement was unfortunately largely composed, to reflect on this question put to us by the whole world, by all peoples, by all mankind.

I do not think we can adjourn without knowing the answer to that question. For that reason, my delegation considers that part of the proposal just made by the United Kingdom representative is sound, that is to say, that before we adjourn for the Easter recess, the three nuclear Powers should meet and accept the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for discussion just as the Soviet Union has already done. We further express the wish and the hope that these discussions may not be overshadowed by the threat of nuclear tests by the Western Powers, this being an indispensable condition of their effectiveness, that they may take place without interruption and without any danger of being overtaken by the dread reality of such tests.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): As I said earlier this morning, my Government sincerely welcomed the memorandum of the eight new members of the

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Conference and the impetus which their endeavour has given to the renewal of the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty. As they all know, we have been working in Geneva since 31 October 1958. It is hard to understand why it is said that highly technical questions cannot be injected into these negotiations, because fundamentally what we are dealing with is probably the most difficult scientific question in the world. And when such a highly technical scientific question is being dealt with, I submit, with great respect, that it does not really aid the solution of the problem to say that such a question should be considered without reference to highly technical scientific matters.

The United Kingdom and the United States delegations painstakingly drafted a complete treaty (ENDC/9) which was tabled on 18 April 1961, just a year ago. We made some eighteen or twenty amendments to it in an effort to meet the problems raised by the Soviet Union. We have studied with the utmost care this problem of the spacing of control posts as dealt with in the Geneva experts' reports of 1958 and 1959. It would be a matter of very great concern to my delegation if a system of control posts were worked out in which the spacing was not on a scientific basis.

We are certainly prepared to work with the eight new members of the Conference and to give the greatest consideration to their memorandum. But I want to be very clear and explicit; I do not want there to be any misunderstanding. The United States Government will sign a treaty today with the Soviet Union which provides for effective, objective, scientific international control under the system set up by the Geneva experts in 1958 and 1959, and which provides for objective, scientific, on-site inspections. We are prepared to listen to what any delegation has to say. However, should there be any idea that we are going to rely again on any unpoliced, uninspected moratorium, on the word of the Soviet Union, the answer is that we will not. I want to make that very clear, because we do not have any confidence in the word of the Soviet Union. I am sorry, but that is the way it is. We are quite prepared to take part in negotiations, but that requirement for objective, scientific effective international control with adequate on-site inspections is fundamental.

If the Soviet Union is prepared to tell us that it will abandon its completely unrealistic position of 28 November 1961, I am sure that, with the help of the eight nations, we can go forward. But we cannot do so if the Soviet Union is going to tell us that it is going to completely reverse its own

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scientists' recommendations. I call to the attention of this Conference that the Soviet Union has not adduced a single scientific statement in support of their contention that national detection systems are adequate. All the scientific evidence points the other way. I am confident they cannot produce a single statement by an internationally known scientist to support their statement. We have waited for three years. When the Soviet Union started testing last September, another conference was taking place and, as far as I am aware, it adopted no resolution asking the Soviet Union not to continue with its tests. I believe statements were made by the representative of the United Arab Republic deploring such tests, as indeed we all did.

The United States is quite prepared to continue with these negotiations and, as far as we are concerned, there will be no interruption in them. However, I do not think anyone should labour under any delusion that the United States is going to be deceived twice, because we are not.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): After the statement I made on the instruction of the Soviet Government, we naturally listened with close attention to the statements made in this Committee, particularly by our partners in these negotiations, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom; for naturally it is the position of these Powers which now virtually determines the future prospects of our negotiations and lay the foundation for solution of the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. What then have we found in the two statements made by the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom?

As we know, the situation that had arisen before the eight neutral States took the latest step was indeed a melancholy one. It was clearly impossible to reach agreement and to continue fruitful negotiations on the discontinuance of tests in view of the extreme difference between the positions of the sides participating in these negotiations. This was what gave rise to concern throughout the world, and caused the eight States who are members of our Committee to take the step they have. They endeavoured to find a basis for further negotiations, a new approach to a successful continuation and conclusion of the negotiations to end all tests. They have set out their position, which is not that of either the United States or the Soviet Union. They have set out their position in the document which they submitted for study by all the Governments, especially by those of the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In his first statement today the United States representative said that the crucial missing link in the nuclear test ban talks has been a common basis for the negotiations, because of the Soviet Union's refusal to accept the basis proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom. He stated further that we must find a basis for negotiations with the framework of the Sub-Committee.

It is this basis for negotiations that has been presented by the representatives of the eight non-aligned States. I repeat that this basis is not a United States basis nor a Soviet Union basis, but the basis of the eight non-aligned States. And what did the Soviet Government reply to this proposal of a compromise basis for negotiations? It replied absolutely clearly and unequivocally that the Soviet Union accepts this basis for negotiations. What is the reply of the United States and the United Kingdom? It is substantially, as the Czechoslovak representative correctly indicated, that they are prepared to conduct negotiations if the Soviet Union is prepared to accept their conditions.

That is the reply of the United States and the United Kingdom. Is that acceptance of the proposal of the eight non-aligned States as a basis for negotiations? It is nothing of the kind. It is a refusal to accept the basis offered for negotiations. It is an attempt to substitute their own conditions, their own basis for negotiations, for the basis proposed by the eight non-aligned States. But that is not the way to conduct negotiations on an equal footing. You have no right to present us with an ultimatum. And we have never accepted such ultimatums and will not accept them. We want to negotiate on an equal footing like any other self-respecting State, and we will not allow you to dictate your conditions to us.

We propose that negotiations should be conducted on an equal footing, and now suggest that the basis proposed by the eight non-aligned countries should be accepted as the basis for the negotiations. Answer the whole world and our Committee: are you or are you not prepared to accept these conditions? And do not start asking us unnecessary questions. We have answered the main question in the document. We have answered this question in the affirmative. Mr. Dean has asked us to confirm in writing that we accept their conditions. We are submitting to you a written document: the Soviet Government's reply to the proposal of the eight States (ENDC/32). We are announcing, not only orally but in writing, that we accept this proposal as a basis for negotiations. Give us

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at any rate a verbal answer: do you or do you not accept it as a basis for negotiations? The answer to this question has to be simple and clear. It is no use dithering, or trying to evade the issue, or confusing this very clear question with all sorts of "ifs", such as "if you accept this or that", "if you admit that there must be an international system of control and inspection", "if you agree that we can despatch inspection teams wherever we please", etc., etc.

Why do you ask these questions? Why have you put nearly twenty questions to the non-aligned States themselves? They were quite right not to answer these questions, because in order to answer them a treaty must be drafted on the basis proposed by the neutral States. That is precisely where your position differs from ours. We have stated that we are prepared to adopt the new basis for negotiations. But you are proposing that we should go back to the old basis - your basis - for negotiations. That is what you are proposing. But the eight non-aligned countries demand something different. They are perfectly aware that there cannot now be successful negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement on the old basis. They can see that. We have now been debating for a month, and they are all perfectly aware that no agreement can be reached on the old basis. That is why they have proposed a new basis.

What is your answer to them? Your answer is in fact a refusal. That is the sense of your answer. If you are prepared to conduct negotiations on the basis proposed in the eight-nation memorandum, then let us start negotiations. It is no use presenting us with preliminary conditions. But you do not give us a clear answer to this question. And Mr. Godber goes on to demand that we should present our explanations of how we understand various matters. We have given an absolutely clear answer by the Soviet Government. If you have not studied it, then do so. You will have time to study the document. It is a written document, which we suggest you should study if you are not clear about our reply. But I think the world will find it clear enough. We are for continuing negotiations on the basis proposed by the eight non-aligned States. So now give us your reply - one that will be completely clear and definite to the whole world and to us - whether you are prepared or not prepared to conduct negotiations on the basis proposed by the eight States.

That is the reply that is called for today. It is called for not only by us but by the whole world. And you cannot wriggle out of giving it, however much

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you may talk here on irrelevant topics and whatever questions you may put. You cannot wriggle out of replying to this question, because the whole world will be asking it. The Soviet Union has given an affirmative reply to the proposal of the eight non-aligned States. The Western Powers have not given an affirmative reply. Or are you going to give one? Perhaps you are going to amend your original reply? Go ahead; we are prepared to take our seats immediately at the negotiating table and to conduct negotiations on the basis proposed by the eight non-aligned States. But if you want to substitute your own basis for theirs, then of course there is no basis for fruitful negotiations. That is clear to everyone.

But that, of course, was not why the eight States proposed their basis for negotiations. What they were seeking was a compromise. And what is it that you want? You are not seeking a compromise - you want to dictate terms. That is what you want. But no self-respecting State ever replies to dictation.

If you want to conduct negotiations in a genuinely businesslike way, let us start negotiating on the basis proposed in the eight-nation memorandum. This is the reply we must have from you and it must be a clear and definite reply. You cannot wriggle out of giving it to us. If not today, then you will have to give it tomorrow.

The second question that has inevitably arisen in this connexion is that of the conditions under which fruitful negotiations can take place. The Soviet Government has also quite clearly defined its position on this issue:

"... Fruitful negotiations on the discontinuance of tests cannot be conducted to the thunder of nuclear explosions. Therefore, the Soviet Government is of the opinion - since this is the only way the spirit and sense of the proposals made by the neutralist States can be interpreted - that now that these proposals hold out new prospects for the negotiations and for the attainment of agreement, it becomes even more important for the nuclear Powers to give a voluntary undertaking not to set off nuclear explosions while the negotiations are in progress. The Soviet Government confirms its readiness to give such an undertaking if the Western Powers will do likewise." (ENDC/32, page 4)

And what were we told about that? We were told in the last statement by the United States representative, "Have no illusions, make no mistake", and the rest. The United Kingdom representative has also said that he, if you please,

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is sceptical about the prospects of negotiations in general. In his first statement Mr. Dean said that he sees little hope of success in the negotiations. Why? Why are you so sceptical, why do you look at the negotiations on a new basis with so little hope? Why? Clearly because you do not want an agreement. You do not want any agreement; you want to continue testing nuclear weapons. That is the explanation of your position. You want to carry on with tests and do not care a fig for anything else or for any proposals the non-aligned States may put forward. That is why you say: "Have no illusions: we have set off explosions and shall continue to do so; that is our reply".

But we say to you, if you really want serious negotiations, with the genuine intention of concluding an agreement and not of misleading the peoples of the world, then you must arrange for these negotiations to be carried on in normal conditions without nuclear explosions. These are the basic conditions for successful negotiations. Although recently, indeed just the other day, you referred to the replies of your Governments to the effect that they refused to give any such undertaking, you are not taking into account the new circumstances that have arisen today. You gave your reply before the Soviet Government had given its assent to the new basis for negotiations. Now you have this assent.

The question now is: are you prepared to negotiate really seriously and conclude an agreement, or are you merely talking about it in order to reassure your own people and the peoples of the whole world? As you have received the Soviet Government's consent to conduct negotiations on the basis proposed by the eight non-aligned States, you cannot stand pat on continuation of the atomic arms race and a new spiral of nuclear explosions, if you want to conduct really serious negotiations and conclude an agreement. You cannot do it. That, when viewed objectively, is a quite incompatible position for any supporter of a genuine conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all tests. You cannot with one hand agree to negotiation in order to conclude an agreement, and with the other hand give the signal for starting explosions.

When the United States and United Kingdom Governments sent their message to the Soviet Government (ENDC/24), both admitted the possibility that tests might not take place. Did they or did they not? You cannot deny that they admitted the possibility that tests might not take place. This possibility is at present still great and must be used. There is an opportunity to conclude an agreement on a new footing, proposed neither by us nor by you, but by the neutral States.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Why do you now reject that opportunity? Why? There can be but one reply: you reject it because you do not want any agreement. You were always opposed to the discontinuance of nuclear tests, and you are opposed to it now. Therefore you are opposed to establishing conditions for the effective conclusion of an agreement on a new basis. That is why your reply to the question: "Are you going to resume tests, or are you not?" is: "We shall resume them". This merely shows the entire world the real position you have adopted on this important matter.

We have been negotiating on this subject for over a month. The Committee has had this question before it for over a month. A painful search has been made for something new, for a position that would not be damaging to the prestige of the States engaged in the negotiations, or to their immediate interests, etc.

I must say that the representatives of the non-aligned States have indeed toiled like Sisyphus; they have attempted to create and have created a new basis for negotiations. The Soviet Government immediately responded to this worthwhile step by these countries. The position of the Western Powers is one evading the problem, of being unwilling to negotiate on a basis of equality, of making repeated attempts to impose their conditions. But such imposed conditions cannot, of course, provide a basis for concluding an agreement.

When we proposed our conditions to you, you rejected them. Then what makes you think that if you continue to insist on your conditions, we shall have to accept them?

We are now suggesting that you should adopt an unexceptionable course, that of accepting a new basis for negotiations that has been proposed neither by you nor by us but by the eight non-aligned States. Why then do you not accept this basis? Why do you first want to put into the bag, so to speak, all our concessions towards your position? Why? We do not ask this of you, so do not ask it of us.

We want to conduct negotiations on a basis of equality, on the basis that has been proposed by the eight non-aligned States. Please be good enough to give us your reply: do you or do you not agree to this? And there is a question to which we want an answer: do you or do you not agree to create the basic minimum conditions for the success of our negotiations and not to resume tests? Let the entire world hear you.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

So far your reply has been a negative one. But I do not think that it will be met with enthusiasm in the world at large, especially in the new situation that has arisen following the proposals of the eight non-aligned States, following our acceptance of the proposal as a basis for negotiations.

Such, gentlemen, is the opinion I wished to express in the light of the statements that have just been made. I should like to express the hope that the answer which has just been given by the United States and the United Kingdom representatives is not the final answer of their Governments. I should also like to express the hope that, like the Soviet Union, they will give us an official statement by their Governments on their attitude to the proposal introduced by the eight non-aligned States, in other words, that they will tell us whether the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom accept these proposals by the eight States as a basis for negotiations. If their reply is a positive one, we are prepared to begin negotiations immediately.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The United Kingdom representative proposed just now that in view of the urgency of the question of nuclear tests the Sub-Committee should meet this afternoon. At this meeting he wishes to obtain further explanations from the Soviet Union representative and to see whether those explanations conform to the conditions he has laid down. As there will be no meetings for four days, we think that consideration of this problem is a matter of urgency. Our Committee must be in a position to decide whether or not there are to be discussions between the nuclear Powers on the basis proposed by the eight non-aligned countries.

Consequently, if we are to have a meeting in order to reach such a decision and to give the nuclear Powers an opportunity of coming to an agreement on the basis of the proposal of the eight non-aligned nations - a basis already accepted by the Soviet Union - it might be preferable to convene a plenary meeting of the Conference, rather than the Sub-Committee of nuclear Powers. That would enable us to reach a decision this afternoon. Otherwise I see no chance of so doing. There is no reason for convening a Sub-Committee in which the discussion would not be on the new basis proposed here, but on the old basis, under the old conditions laid down by the Western nuclear Powers. Hence, if the United Kingdom representative agrees, I think it would be better to hold a plenary meeting this afternoon in order to arrive at a decision. Delegations

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would have an opportunity to studying the Soviet Union reply and the proposal of the non-aligned countries and could then define their positions. That is the proposal I wished to make, after the proposal made by the United Kingdom representative.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I made the suggestion, a little while ago, that the Sub-Committee might meet this afternoon because I wanted clarification. I am perfectly prepared to meet in whatever forum is deemed suitable, but I would have thought that a meeting of the Sub-Committee would be helpful. Neither of the co-Chairmen has commented on this, and I do not know what their views on it are. What I wanted to do was to get a clear picture of what exactly the Soviet Union has said to us this morning because, in spite of the two speeches we have heard from Mr. Zorin, I am still by no means clear. He has made great play with the fact that he says he has accepted the proposals of the eight unaligned countries as a basis of negotiation, but he has in no way refuted what I pointed out to him in the message from Mr. Khrushchev which he read into the record on Monday of this week. I would suggest that these two positions are not compatible. It is for this reason that I do want to be clear as to just exactly what our Soviet colleagues are offering us in this regard.

It was in that sense that I thought a meeting of the smaller body might be helpful, so that we could know exactly what the Soviet Union has proposed. Of course, if there is some new move which would enable us to make progress, we should obviously want to consult our Governments. That was the sole purpose of my suggestion this morning. I should be very happy to have a meeting this afternoon. I still would have thought that the Sub-Committee would be the most suitable body, but I am in the hands of my colleagues and I think possibly the two co-Chairmen might be able to resolve this point.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): If it is agreeable to my co-Chairman, I should myself be quite happy to accept the suggestion of the delegation of the United Kingdom that the Sub-Committee should meet this afternoon. I am quite prepared to continue these negotiations, and so far as I am concerned a meeting this afternoon would be quite agreeable.

I listened with great interest to the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union. I hoped to find something new in it but, I am sorry to say, he

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has given us only a stone. Unfortunately he has made it abundantly clear that the Soviet Union is still vehemently opposed to inclusion of adequate and effective international control in a nuclear test ban treaty, with on-site inspection at the discretion of the international control commission. My own interpretation of the Soviet Government's statement is that it rejects the eight-Power memorandum as a basis for negotiations, because it seems to me that international controls are implicit in that memorandum.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The proposals which have just been made call for an immediate decision. The Soviet delegation is ready to meet this afternoon in this Committee in order to obtain an absolutely clear reply from the United States and the United Kingdom on whether they are prepared to accept the proposal of the eight States as a basis for negotiations. We are ready to meet this afternoon on this subject and to exchange views. We could do so at 3 p.m. or 3.30 p.m. We have submitted our own reply to this question in written form and I think representatives will have an opportunity to study the text during the lunch recess.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I am of course quite agreeable to a plenary meeting this afternoon, if that is the wish of the Conference, but I have stated the position of my Government very clearly and very explicitly and the Conference would hear exactly the same statement this afternoon.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The delegation of Canada would doubt whether a continuation this afternoon of the plenary meeting this morning would bring any more results than we have had up to the present. It would seem to us better for a pause to ensue so that we can all have time to study these matters. The decision as to whether to continue the negotiations is essentially now in the hands of the three members of the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee. I do not believe that a continuation of the present meeting is likely to bring about any positive result.

I should like to hear the views of some of the sponsors of the memorandum on whether they feel that this meeting ought to be continued. In the absence of any positive request on their part, it would seem to me to be better for us

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

not to follow this morning's discussion immediately with another of the same character.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): At the beginning of our proceedings we adopted methods and procedures which must be followed. We set up a Sub-Committee of the nuclear Powers to study this very question, on the understanding that it would report progress to us from time to time. I think we should follow the same procedure today. I made a specific proposal just now, which was supported by the Indian delegation, to the effect that the memorandum submitted by the eight nations should be referred to the Sub-Committee of the three nuclear Powers, which should study it and report back to us: that was my proposal and I maintain it.

Mrs. LYRDAL (Sweden): We have been trying to work for a spirit of compromise here. The sponsors of the joint memorandum, of course, wanted this matter to be first of all considered by the Sub-Committee on a nuclear test ban treaty. As the representative of Ethiopia stated this morning, that is where we think the answers will come from. However, I have a compromise suggestion as to the schedule of meetings. If the Sub-Committee could meet first this afternoon, we might have a very brief plenary meeting afterwards to hear a report immediately on what had happened there. I hope that that will enable us all to enjoy the Easter vacation with greater peace of mind.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): It was we who proposed a plenary meeting this afternoon. I should like to explain that we wished to have this plenary meeting in order to establish the basis for the discussions of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. If we understand the Italian delegation's proposal correctly, and if that delegation agrees that its proposal should be taken to mean that the Sub-Committee will meet for discussion on the basis of the non-aligned nations' memorandum, we have no objection. That would be very satisfactory and very useful to us. But if the Sub-Committee resumes its former disputes, there will certainly be no new basis for discussion which could lead to useful results. We therefore think it would be very useful to decide whether to refer this proposal, as a basis for discussion, to the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): We now have to decide whether the proposal made by the Italian representative, amplifying the proposal made by the United Kingdom representative, is acceptable to the two co-Chairmen.

Two further suggestions have been made: one by the representative of Canada, who said that it was no use continuing the discussion in the manner in which it has been proceeding in this committee, but thought that the negotiations should be continued in Sub-Committee; and the other by the representative of Sweden.

As we have decided that questions of this kind cannot be settled by a vote, it is essential to reach agreement, so the two Co-Chairmen must tell us whether they are willing to meet this afternoon to make a joint study of the document submitted by the eight non-aligned countries, and to discuss other matters connected with the statements made in the Committee today. I should therefore like to know whether the two Co-Chairmen are in agreement on this point.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): As co-Chairman, I have already agreed that there should be a meeting of the Sub-Committee on nuclear testing this afternoon. The suggestion of the representative of Italy, which I understood was concurred in by the representative of India, and the suggestion of the representative of Sweden that the Sub-Committee should meet this afternoon is quite agreeable to me as co-Chairman.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We regard the proposal made by Italy and supported by the representative of Sweden as a proposal that the eight-nation memorandum should be transmitted to the Three-Power Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests for study. If the proposal is put in this way, we are prepared to meet in the Sub-Committee to consider this document as a basis for further negotiations. We are also prepared to accept the further suggestion by the Swedish representative that a report on the result of this meeting should be submitted today at a plenary meeting of the Committee. A possible arrangement might be for the Sub-Committee to meet at 3.30 p.m. and this Committee at 5 p.m.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): The Sub-Committee was set up by this full Conference. Apart from the fact that it was to consider ways and means of working out a nuclear test ban treaty, no restrictions were laid down

(Mr. Dean, United States)

as to what could take place at any particular meeting. As co-Chairman, it is quite agreeable to me that there should be a meeting of the Sub-Committee on nuclear testing. I do not acquiesce in any restrictions being placed upon the work of the Sub-Committee.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I do not think it is for us to decide on the Sub-Committee's agenda. We have a document before us and we are referring it to the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee will be responsible for its own proceedings and decisions. It is not for us to decide at this stage how the Sub-Committee is to act.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In view of the situation that has now arisen in the discussion of this question, we do not think our Committee can adjourn for the Easter vacation without knowing how the question of discontinuing nuclear weapon tests is to be settled. Therefore, as the United States representative objects to setting any time-limit for the work of the Sub-Committee, I am prepared to meet his point and propose that the Disarmament Committee should meet late this evening, or if more convenient to the majority of members, tomorrow morning, in order to hear the report of the Sub-Committee on the results of its meeting today. But I think that we cannot leave for the Easter vacation without knowing whether or not work on an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is to be carried out in future on the basis proposed by the eight non-aligned States, and whether or not nuclear explosions are to take place. We cannot disperse without having a reply to these two questions. Therefore I propose that we should ask our Chairman to get into touch with the Three-Power Sub-Committee and to convene an evening meeting of this Committee. If the Sub-Committee cannot finish its work today, then I propose that we meet tomorrow at 10 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): In view of the opinions stated by the two Co-Chairmen, it will be possible for the Sub-Committee to meet this afternoon. I do not think there will be any objection to the Chairman for today getting in touch with the members of the Sub-Committee in order to take a decision on the suggestion made by the representative of Sweden, and he could then decide, in the light of whatever report is given on the

(The Chairman, Mexico)

progress of the Sub-Committee's discussion, whether the Conference should meet this evening at a time to be announced, or whether it would be preferable to meet at the usual time tomorrow.

If there are no further comments and no objections, I will assume that this arrangement is satisfactory both to the Co-Chairmen and to the other representatives.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twenty-fourth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. L. Padilla Nervo, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Italy, Poland, India, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Sweden.

"The delegation of the Soviet Union introduced a declaration by the Soviet Government, dated 19 April 1962, replying to the joint memorandum by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

"The Conference decided to transmit the eight-nation joint memorandum to its Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests for study."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.